(1) Chapter 1 - The Autumn of Humanity

"Far from being a cause for despair, this is in fact an opportunity for optimism. Harnessed in the right way, the technology that hastens our obsolescence can open us up to new utopian possibilities and enable heightened forms of ­human flourishing."(1)

"Obsolescence is the pro­cess or condition of being no longer useful or used; it is not a state of nonexistence or death. I am not suggesting, nor assuming, that ­humans are on the cusp of extinction, though ­there are some who worry that might be the case. What I am suggesting is that ­humans are on the cusp of becoming no longer useful—­that we ­will no longer control the fate of the planet and the fate of our species as we have done in the recent past." [mijn nadruk] (2)

[Als mensen de planeet niet sturen en controleren, wie dan wel? Machines? En wie controleren dan de machines?]

"The book ­will defend four main propositions by way of responding to that question.
Proposition 1: The automation of work is both pos­si­ble and desirable: work is bad for most ­people most of the time, in ways that they ­don’t always appreciate. We should do what we can to hasten the obsolescence of ­humans in the arena of work.
Proposition 2: The automation of life more generally (outside of work) is a less positive ­thing: ­there are impor­tant threats to ­human well-­being, meaning, and flourishing that are posed by the use of automating technologies in everyday life. We need to carefully manage our relationship with technology to limit ­those threats.
Proposition 3: One way to manage our relationship with technology would be to build a Cyborg Utopia, but it’s not clear how practical or utopian this would ­really be: integrating ourselves with technology, so that we become cyborgs, might regress the march ­ toward ­human obsolescence outside of work. ­Doing so may have many advantages but ­will also carry practical and ethical risks that make it less desirable than it first appears.
Proposition 4: Another way to manage our relationship with technology would be to build a Virtual Utopia, and this is both more practical and utopian than is commonly assumed: instead of integrating ourselves with machines in an effort to maintain our relevance in the “real” world, we could retreat to “virtual” worlds that are created and sustained by the technological infrastructure that we have built. At first glance, this seems tantamount to giving up, but ­there are compelling philosophical and practical reasons for favoring this approach." [mijn nadruk] (2-3)

[Die proposities worden in het vervolg besproken. ]

"I want to start our journey to the automated ­future by providing more support for my opening contention: that ­ human obsolescence is imminent. This is crucial to the proj­ect that lies ahead."(4)

[Dat klopt, maar helaas is dat een stelling die niet vol te houden is en de mogelijkheden van techniek zwaar overschat.]

"I know that ­people ­will not be convinced about the need to prepare for ­human obsolescence ­unless they are given a full and vivid picture of how automating technologies are undermining (and already have undermined) the need for ­ human activity across virtually all sectors of society."(4)

Volgt een verhaal over 1/ de landbouw waar machines en technologie steeds meer productie mogelijk maken door steeds minder mensen; 2/ de industrie waar dat ook het geval is; 3/ de financiële sector idem; 4/ beroepsgroepen als artsen en juristen; hij beschrijft de opkomt van techniek in diagnostiek en zorg bij artsen en bij advoaten en zo meer; 5/ de dienstensector; 6/ de overheid; 7/ in wetenschap.

"Machines can manage this world far better than ­ humans ever could."(12)

[Ik denk dat dat een onbewezen bewering is. Ik ben nooit zo onder de indruk van een verhaal van de successen van automatisering zonder te wijzen op wat niet geautomatiseerd kon of kan worden en zelfs zonder het te hebben over of het wel zo goed is dat we automatiseren. Opvallend is dat de auteur alles accepteert op het eerste gezicht, hij heeft het nooit over normatieve kwesties.]

"Despite its omissions, the brief tour should impress upon the reader one critical point: everywhere you look, humanity is in retreat. The reason for this is straightforward: technology is advancing and the world is becoming more complex. ­ These two trends go hand-­in-­hand, a mutually reinforcing cycle. This brings us ­great rewards. We are healthier, live longer, and are more productive than ever before. Nevertheless, while our socie­ties advance, we ourselves remain relatively static, still trapped in the biological form bequeathed to us by evolution long before the agricultural revolution even began. Our achievements have been ­great. We have built this technologically advanced and socially complex real­ity. But ­those achievements have made it more likely that it ­will be machines, not ­humans, that manage our ­future. We are not built for that task." [mijn nadruk] (20)

"So if the purpose of this chapter has not been to make a logically watertight case for the imminence of obsolescence, what has it been? The answer: encouraging readers to undertake a perspectival shift."

[Veel beweringen, maar hoe waar zijn ze? Ik vind de hele weergave nogal oppervlakkig. En het vertrouwen in techniek is totaal kritiekloos. Dus waarom zou ik een 'perspectival shift' maken in die richting.]

(23) Part one - Automation

Hier worden de eerste twee proposities (zie hierboven) besproken.

(25) Chapter 2 - The Case for Technological Unemployment

"In saying that it is pos­si­ble to eliminate work from our lives, this chapter contributes to the “technological unemployment” debate. This is the debate about the plausibility and feasibility of widescale, technologically induced unemployment—­a debate that has generated quite of lot of heat in recent years. (...) My goal in what follows is to offer a succinct, novel, and compelling argument for thinking that widescale technological unemployment is pos­si­ble, even if it is not inevitable. This argument will clearly outline the logic of the case in ­favor of technological unemployment and ­will engage with the most up-­to-­date evidence and criticisms thereof." [mijn nadruk] (25-26)

Volgt tekst over hoe we 'werk' moeten definiëren. Zijn eigen definitie:

"Work: Any activity (physical, cognitive, emotional etc.) performed in exchange for an economic reward, or in the ultimate hope of receiving an economic reward."(28)

"The bottom line then is that when I argue that work can and should be automated, what I mean is that work in the economic sense can and should be automated. I do not mean that all forms of activity, be they pleasant or unpleasant, can and should be automated. Indeed, this distinction becomes critical in ­later chapters when I highlight and accept some of the prob­lems with automation."(29)

"Now that we have a clearer sense of what work is, we can make the case that the automation of work is pos­si­ble. But let’s be clear about the limitations of the argument from the outset. No one who argues for the possibility of technological unemployment thinks that technology is ­going to eliminate all forms of work. Even if we create perfect, human-­equivalent androids—­ machines that can do every­thing we can do, only better, faster, and without getting tired—it is still likely that at least some humans ­will be gainfully employed."(30)

Er zijn cijfers over het percentage banen dat vervangen kan worden door automatisering.Hij bespreekt twee rapporten.

"If you just focus on the headline figures from both reports, you might go away with the impression that the case for technological unemployment is pretty strong: just ­under half of all the work currently done in the world is capable of being automated in the very near future. This provides support for at least the first part of the claim made in premise (2) of the argument for technological unemployment—­the claim that technology is replacing more and more forms of ­human work. But once you burrow into the details, you realize that things are a little more nuanced and less clear­cut." [mijn nadruk] (34)

"The major objection to the case for technological unemployment is that it commits the “Luddite fallacy.” That is to say, it makes the assumption that the kinds of work we do—­the tasks that are eco­nom­ically rewarded— are fixed in nature."(35)

[Precies. Er kunnen ook heel wat andere nieuwe banen ontstaan door automatisering.]

"Employment has not vanished in the intervening 200 years. In fact, ­there are more ­people working ­today than ever before. They are just ­doing dif­fer­ent ­things."(35)

"Nevertheless, even if we acknowledge this uncertainty, I think ­there are four good reasons to think that the ­ future of work tells against the critic’s view."(38)

"In sum, ­ these four reasons—­ initial evidence on the equilibrium effects of robotization, accelerating technological change, the general purpose nature of AI and machine complementarity, and the growth of superstar markets—­ call into question the critic’s view. At the very least, they make the elimination of most forms of work through automation a real possibility."(48)

[Theoretisch niet eens, praktisch al helemaal niet.]

"I also noted some additional concerns—­social / regulatory impediment and unsustainability—­but suggested that they did not undermine the basic case for technological unemployment and left unresolved the further question of the desirability of workplace automation. It is to the desirability question that we turn in the next chapter."(52)

(53) Chapter 3 - Why You Should Hate Your Job

"You prob­ably have a job. You may like that job, possibly even love it. It may be the essence of who you are: the ­thing that gets you out of bed in the morning and gives you a sense of purpose in life. My goal in this chapter is to convince you that you are wrong to feel this way. Even if your job seems good to you right now, you should resent living in a world that requires you to work for a living. To put it bluntly: I ­will be arguing that work is bad and getting worse, and we should welcome its technological elimination. This is the desirability claim that forms the second half of the first proposition introduced in Chapter 1. Let me start, however, with a confession: I’m one of ­ those ­people who loves their job. It is the core of who I am. So in arguing that work is bad, I’m arguing against my own day-­to-­day experience of work. This makes the argument I’m defending a tough sell, even to myself. It is, consequently, impor­tant to clarify the structure and scope of the argument."(53)

[Dat maakt ook dit tot zinloze theorie.]

"An alternative strategy would be to argue that all forms of work are, necessarily and inherently, bad (for example, ­ because working for economic reward is inherently unjust or freedom undermining). I call this the “necessity” strategy ­ because it claims that the badness of work is not dependent on contingent features of par­tic­u­lar jobs, but rather is inherent to all jobs."(54)

"In what follows, I ­will defend the structural badness of work by describing five specific features of work in the modern world that make it structurally bad. I ­will respond to the major criticisms of this negative view of work as I go along."(55)

"The structural badness argument has two parts to it. The first part consists in identifying the features of work in the modern world that make it bad for most workers; the second part consists in arguing that ­ these features are difficult to reform or change. I’ll start by focusing on five features of work in the modern world that make it bad for most workers. In brief outline, they are:
The Prob­lem of Dominating Influence: Employment contracts, and, more generally, the state of being employed, typically give em- ployers an unjust dominating power over the lives of workers. This significantly undermines the freedom of workers.
The Prob­lem of Fissuring and Precarity: The working environment is becoming increasingly fissured, and working conditions are becoming increasingly precarious for many workers. This makes working life more unpleasant and stressful.
The Prob­lem of Distributive Injustice: Work is distributively unjust. Technology is resulting in an increasingly polarized workforce in which a small number of highly paid individuals reap most of the economic rewards, and ­these rewards are not, in any obvious way, proportional to effort or merit.
The Prob­lem of Temporal Colonization: Work colonizes our lives. Most of our ­mental and physical effort is taken up with preparing for, performing, or recovering from work. What’s more, this colonization is getting worse as a result of technology.
The Prob­lem of Unhappiness and Dissatisfaction: Most ­people are dissatisfied with their work and think they could do better, and this makes it difficult to justify the other bad-­making features of work.
I ­will pre­sent each of ­these five prob­lems as distinct antiwork arguments. As ­will become clear, they reinforce and complement one another."(55-56)

1/ Domination

"In other words, freedom requires not just the absence of interference but the absence of domination. Only when domination is removed are we truly ­free."(58)

"In any small-­to-large corporate enterprise, employees work within a hierarchical structure that makes them answerable to, and dependent on, a superior. They must ingratiate themselves to ­these superiors and act within the par­ameters determined by ­those superiors. In other words, they live in a state of freedom-undermining domination."(58)

Allerlei bezwaren worden aangevoerd en afgewezen.

"The same is true for employees that are subject to extensive forms of corporate monitoring and surveillance. It all seems fine, ­ until they step out of line."(60)

"The net result is that the law often does ­little to protect against the dominating influence of employers."(61)

"it is simply not true to say that employment is voluntary.(...) Furthermore, it is not true to say that ­people have lots of choice over who their employers are, and can easily exit jobs with unpleasant working conditions."(61)

2/ The Fissuring and Precarity Prob­lem

"Let some other com­pany specialize in manufacture, transportation, payroll, and accounting. ­There was an obvious economic logic to this: ­those peripheral support ser­vices were cost centers within large corporations, not profit centers. If you could outsource them, and pay less as a result, fissuring would be an economic no-­brainer. But to truly benefit from fissuring, certain other innovations ­ were needed."(65)

"The consequences for workers are grim. Three in par­tic­u­lar are worth noting. First, workers are pushed into less secure forms of work, with fewer non-­pay benefits and employment protections. (...) Second, and in addition to this, the workers have to subject themselves to more monitoring and surveillance in order to enable the fissuring. This compounds the dominating influence prob­lem discussed ­earlier. Fi­nally, fissuring and precarity result in much less pay for workers. ­There is a ­simple economic logic to this too. Fissuring changes how the benefits of corporate activity are shared among the key stakeholders in any corporate enterprise: consumers, investors, and workers. Fissuring typically results in a better deal for investors and consumers: costs are reduced and profits go up. But this comes at the expense of the workers, who are pushed out and contracted in at reduced rates."(66)

"We should definitely be rethinking how we share the benefits of technologically facilitated productivity, and ­legal and regulatory reform to working con- ditions ­will be essential to that task, but it is not clear that the best solution to the prob­lem is to retain our commitment to work if its consequences are unpleasant for workers. Abandoning our commitment to work may be our best hope."(68)

3/ The Distributive Injustice Prob­lem

"The third argument for the structural badness of work is that work is “distributively unjust.” By this, I mean that the rewards of work (particularly income) are not shared in a fair or proportionate manner: a small group of individuals take most of the income, to the detriment of the majority. This claim needs to be interpreted properly. I would neither expect nor desire a world of perfect pay equity. Some differences in pay are justifiable due to differences in skill and effort, and some differentiation might be desirable in order to spur innovation. My claim is that the kinds of differentiation we currently witness are not justifiable in ­these terms, and are being exacerbated by technological change."(68)

"The majority of workers displaced since 1980 have been pushed into manual work, with its lower incomes and more precarious working conditions, which has had obvious repercussions for wage in­equality. I would argue that this polarization effect is a clear manifestation of the distributive injustice of work as it is currently structured. Routine workers have not been displaced ­because of a lack of skill and effort, nor ­because of any personal moral or cognitive failing, but ­because their jobs happened to be relatively easy to automate. They ­were the low-­hanging fruit: the first to be cut down by the machines. Furthermore, they ­were not displaced into better opportunities and better working conditions. On the contrary, they have been left in a worse predicament than before. It is hard to see how this outcome could be justified by any of the leading theories of distributive justice."(70-71)

4/ The Temporal and Mental Colonization Prob­lem

"It means that our ­free time is not ­really ­free time at all. It is time that we spend recovering from and preparing for work."(73)

"­There are three ways in which to make the case for the colonizing power of work. The first is to use a combination of intuition and common experience; the second is to focus on evidence suggesting that ­people have “lost time” to work in the past half century; and the third is to use a game theoretical model that explains why ­people increasingly allow work to colonize their lives. I’ll use all three tactics to make the case."(74)

"The bound­aries between the working day and the rest of one’s life have consequently blurred beyond all recognition. The classic slogan of the ­ labor movement—­“eight hours for work. eight hours for sleep, and eight hours for what we ­will”—is quaint and naive. Jonathan Crary makes the point in stark and pessimistic terms in his book 24 / 7: Late Capitalism and the End of Sleep. He argues that we have created a digitally mediated, globalized workplace. It is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. It is always ­there, always demanding more from us."(75)

5/ The Unhappiness and Dissatisfaction Prob­lem

"It would, however, be patronizing and paternalistic if I completely ignored how ­people actually felt about their work. ­These feelings have to be part of the overall assessment of the badness of work. Fortunately, the evidence we have on ­these feelings supports the general contention that work is structurally bad."(80)

"I think it is reasonably obvious that the five features of work outlined above satisfy ­these conditions of structural badness. They are each the product of forces that are larger than any one individual or group of individuals and would be very difficult for such individuals to reform."(82)

"Consequently, addressing ­these prob­lems would require reform of the basic rules of capitalism, some suppression or ban of widely used technologies, as well as reform of the ­ legal and social norms that apply to work. It’s not something that employees and employers can easily rectify by themselves." [mijn nadruk] (82)

"­Because of this, I argue that it is worth considering the more radical alternative—­that of abolishing the system of work—­and accepting the automation of most eco­nom­ically productive ­labor. ­There are three reasons for this: not working would be better, all t­hings considered, for ­human flourishing; that radical alternative is, to some extent, implicit in the current trajectory of technological change; and, to the extent that it would require significant social cooperation and coordination to achieve, it would seem to be no greater a challenge than trying to reform the current system."(83)

[Ik ben bang dat allebei onmogelijk zijn. ]

"I want to close out this chapter by considering three general objections to the argument I have made."(83)

"The first of ­those is something I ­will call the “structural goodness” argument. It is the antithesis of the view I have presented so far. I have been harping on the structural properties of work that make it bad; but surely ­there are structural properties that make it good? Anca Gheaus and Lisa Herzog have defended something like this view in a paper entitled “The Goods of Work (Other Than Money).”"(83)

"They identify four such properties:
Mastery: Work is a privileged forum in which to master certain skills, and this is a pro­cess and state of being that ­people find very rewarding.
Contribution: Work is the main way in which ­people make a positive contribution to the socie­ties in which they live.
Community: Work provides ­people with communities with whom they can interact and collaborate.
Status: Work is the main way in which ­people attain social status and esteem. This gives ­people a greater sense of self-­worth."(84)

[Dat lijkt me goed gezien. ]

"This is undoubtedly true, but this is largely ­ because of the colonizing power of work. It is ­ because we spend (and have to spend) so much of our time performing, planning for, and worrying about work that we rely on it for mastery, contribution, community, and status. It is not as if ­those goods are impossible to obtain outside the confines of the workplace."(84)

[Dat is ook weer waar. ]

"The third general objection to the structural badness thesis is the “opportunity cost” objection. To this point, I have said a lot about what makes work bad, but I ­ haven’t said much about the alternatives. Why assume that they ­will be any better? Work might be pretty awful as it currently stands, but a world without work might be much worse. It might be a world of deprivation, listlessness, social conflict, lack of purpose, and so on. This is a common dystopian belief." [mijn nadruk] (86)

"I agree. That’s why the remainder of this book ­will be dedicated to evaluating and defending dif­fer­ent versions of the post-­work world. Suffice to say, I think some of ­those versions have ­great potential, and ­others are less appealing. Creating the right kind of post-­work ­future ­will be key to making good on the claim defended thus far in the book, namely, that the automation of work is both pos­si­ble and desirable."(86)

(87) Chapter 4 - Giving Techno-­Pessimism Its Due

"The purpose of this chapter is to develop a field guide to the threats that need to be avoided if we are to secure a desirable post-­work future."(87)

De tweede Propositie wordt dus besproken hier.

"I ­will do this in three steps. First, I ­will explain what it is that ­humans need in order to flourish and what will need to be preserved (and enhanced) in order to sustain our flourishing in the post-­work ­future. Second, I ­will present a theoretical framework for thinking about the threats that automating technologies may pose to our flourishing. Third, I will argue for the existence of five such threats. This will set the stage for the second half of the book wherein we consider two major strategies for avoiding ­ these threats."(88)

[Danaher is een kei in het opbouwen en het uitleggen van de organisatie van zijn boek. Prettig.]

"I want to take advantage of the best work that has been done to date on the question of what makes for a good life and use this to figure out ­whether automating technologies could help or hinder our capacity to live a good life. I ­will do this by isolating some generic and widely accepted conditions for a flourishing and meaningful existence. When combined with the framework set out in the next chapter, this will allow me to sketch an abstract landscape of possibility for a “good” (or utopian) post-­work ­future."(88)

"From here on out, I will frequently talk about the need for a flourishing and meaningful existence. I use both terms to refer to dif­fer­ent aspects of what a good life is. I use “flourishing” to refer to how well someone’s life is going for them, that is, to their well-being. I use “meaningful” to refer to some additional component of the good life that is not always reducible to well-­being, that is, the overarching significance or worthwhileness of an individual’s life. ­"(89)

"I ­will assume that in order to live a flourishing and meaningful life you need to satisfy some combination of subjective and objective conditions; and I ­will assume that ­these conditions include, in the case of flourishing, ­things like plea­sure, education, health, friendship, developed cognitive ability, and in the case of meaning, ­things like fulfillment, achievement, and contributions to the Good, the True and the Beautiful. The more of ­these conditions that can be satisfied, the better, on average, the life."(92)

"The only conditions that I ­will decisively reject at this point are the religious / super­natural ones."(93)

[Gelukkig maar. ]

"In sum, when assessing ­ whether an automated post-­work ­future is one in which ­humans can flourish, it is impor­tant to consider the extent to which that ­future enables us to satisfy the subjective and objective conditions of flourishing and meaning, as well as the extent to which it facilitates a relevant connection between the two. To do this effectively it is essential that we have a good ­mental model for understanding our relationship to automating technologies." [mijn nadruk] (93)

"Technology mediates our relationship to the world around us by creating new affordances [mogelijkheden] in our environments."(94)

"The mediating effects of technology have an impor­tant impact on our capacity to live a flourishing and meaningful life. By changing our relation to the external world, and by affording us new possibilities for action, technology changes our capacity to satisfy the subjective and objective conditions of flourishing and meaning. It also alters the relationship between the subjective and objective. In many instances, the effects of technology are a net positive."(94)

"One aspect that is particularly useful in the pre­sent context is that it en- courages us to think about the importance of so-­called cognitive artifacts in the pursuit of the good life. Cognitive artifacts can be defined as any tools, objects or pro­cesses that assist in the per­for­mance of a cognitive task."(96)

Krakauer onderscheidt tussen 'enhancing', 'complementary' en 'competitive cognitive artifacts'.

"The argument that I make ­here, and that Krakauer makes in his work, is that advances in AI and robotics tend ­ toward the competitive end of this spectrum. They assist ­humans in the per­for­mance of cognitive tasks, and sometimes do so in complementary or enhancing ways, but often tend ­towards replacing or outsourcing ­human cognition. Krakauer thinks this is bad ­because it breeds technological de­pen­dency, which could have a knock-on effect on our autonomy and resiliency." [mijn nadruk] (98)

Five Arguments for Techno-­Pessimism

"That’s enough scene setting. I now turn to the main purpose of this chapter. As mentioned at the outset, I want to pre­sent five arguments for being pessimistic about the impact of automation on ­ human flourishing and meaning. ­These arguments are intended to cast serious doubt on our ability to live a good life in a fully automated, post-­work world. Each of the arguments focuses on a dif­fer­ent way in which the widespread availability of automating technologies mediates and thereby changes our relationship with the world around us, in par­tic­u­lar by changing how we relate to the subjective and objective conditions of meaning and flourishing.(...) But before we run off into the post-­work world, we need to pause to consider what kind of world we are escaping into. This is my attempt to paint a bleak picture of that world. It is only by fully acknowledging this potential bleakness that we can embrace the more optimistic views defended in ­later chapters. Before I get into the five arguments, I need to say a word or two about the prob­lem of deprivation in a post-­work world." [mijn nadruk] (100)

"This is what I call the “deprivation prob­lem.” Any world in which mass deprivation is a real­ity, automated or other­wise, could not be conducive to human flourishing and meaning. ­People need a basic platform of health and well-­ being before they can truly flourish and pursue proj­ects of ­great meaning. Consequently, any post-­work world worth its salt ­will need to solve the deprivation prob­lem. But I am not ­ going to solve or propose a resolution to the deprivation prob­lem in this book. It is not my goal: I want to consider what happens even if we do manage to solve that prob­lem.(...) I feel confident in doing so, however, ­because I think the deprivation prob­lem is solvable. ­There are two reasons for my optimism." [mijn nadruk] (100)

[Belangrijker is als het niet opgelost wordt, lijkt me.]

1/ The Severance Prob­lem

"The first argument for pessimism is the most general. It claims that the widespread availability of automating technologies is a prob­lem ­because it threatens to sever the link between ­humans and the objective world."(101)

"For example, many basic moral prob­lems—­disease, suffering, in­equality— are caused by ­ human imperfections and could be addressed through better automated systems. Much of the excitement around self-­driving cars stems from the belief that they can reduce the carnage on our roads that is caused by irresponsible ­ human ­drivers. Removing humans from the loop could make the world a better—or at least safer—­place for all."(105)

[Ik vind dat een overschatting van wat techniek kan. Bovendien wordt techniek nog altjd gemaakt door die onvolmaakte mensen binnen onvolmaakte systemen als het kapitalisme.]

"It is, however, to say that ­there is a growing ­will and desire to use automating technologies to solve basic moral prob­lems, which ­ will mean that this aspect of the good life is likely to be reduced in scope by the development of such technologies. The same goes for the pursuit of knowledge and the discovery of truth."(105)

[Ook hier op de ondergrond een mateloos optimisme over wat techniek kan. Maar de basisvraag is nog steeds: is dat optimisme gerechtvaardigd? ]

"That’s the severance prob­lem. It is the most basic and fundamental of the prob­lems discussed in this chapter. The four remaining prob­lems complement and elaborate upon it."(106)

[Dat vind ik helemaal niet. Het hoofdprobleem is of technologie al die dingen kan doen.]

2/ The Attention Prob­lem

"To suggest that technology has not captured our attention would, then, fly in the face of everyday experience. But has it captured our attention in destructive and counterproductive ways? That might be less obvious, but the indications are certainly ­there. For one ­thing, the kinds of attention that it captures are noted to be remarkably shallow and fragmented in nature."(109)

3/ The Opacity Prob­lem

"The strug­gles of our animist ancestors and the pigeons in Skinner’s boxes are illustrations of the prob­lem of opacity—of what happens when the world is deeply mysterious and seemingly enchanted, when the world is blanketed by a veil of ignorance, and when ­ things just happen to us and we don’t ­really know why. To be clear, this prob­lem of opacity ­doesn’t arise only in relation to our understanding of the natu­ral world. The social world can also be opaque." [mijn nadruk] (112)

"Although opacity is a per­sis­tent prob­lem, what I want to suggest ­here is that automating technologies are likely to exacerbate the prob­lem of opacity, making both the natu­ral, and particularly the social, worlds more difficult to understand. This ­will significantly undermine our capacity to live flourishing and meaningful lives."(112)

4/ The Autonomy Prob­lem

"The fourth argument for pessimism focuses on the impact of automating technologies on autonomy / freedom."(117)

"Automating technologies could be used to “brainwash” us into accepting a certain set of values and beliefs, thereby manipulating our choices; they could be used to coerce us into ­doing ­things against our will (for example, by telling us to stand up and get some exercise or risk losing access to health insur- ance or government-­funded healthcare), or they could introduce a new form of domination—­domination by tech com­pany or even AI itself—­into our lives."(121)

5/ The Agency Prob­lem

"This is significant ­ because moral agency is central to the good life. A moral patient can experience many of the joys of life, but to actually participate in them, achieve them, and take responsibility for them, agency is crucial."(125)

"The prob­lem with automating technologies is that they suppress our agency. By severing the connection between what we do and what happens to us, by distracting us from proj­ects and tasks of significant concern, by making the world less comprehensible to creatures like us, and by nudging or interfering with our autonomy, they bring our patiency-­like properties to the fore and encourage us to neglect our agency-­like skills."(125)

[Ik vind die vijf bezwaren tegen techniek eignlijk nietszeggend. Het zijn mooie filosofische analyses, maar niet erg praktisch. ]

"Despite this, I have overlooked some obvious critiques of automating technologies. For example, I have overlooked the concerns of people like Nick Bostrom, Roman Yampolskiy, and Olle Haggstrôm, who argue that superintelligent forms of AI could pose an existential threat to humanity. They could become so smart and so power­ful that one small misstep in their design could result in catastrophic harm to ­ humans. This view has influenced some key figures in the tech industry too, such as Elon Musk and Jaan Tallinn. If this doomsaying turns out to be correct, then it would obviously have an impact on ­human flourishing and meaning. If the superintelligent AI turns us all into paperclips—to use a colorful thought experiment that is popu­lar among contributors to the debate on existential risk from AI—­then you can say goodbye to the good life." [mijn nadruk] (127)

[En dat is waar het om draait. ]

"Why have I ignored their arguments? I do so for two main reasons. First, I have previously expressed doubt about some of the epistemic princi­ples underpinning this doomsaying school of thought. In brief, I argue that it could be very difficult to determine ­whether or not the view is correct, given the kinds of argumentative speculation its proponents are willing to entertain."(127)

[Een vreemd argument, als je bedenkt dat het standpunt van Danaher even speculatief het omgekeerde beweert, namelijk dat technologie de oplossing is voor alles.]

"The other obvious critique that I have overlooked is the po­liti­cal one. To be sure, some of my arguments have a po­liti­cal backdrop and involve po­liti­cally charged concepts—­such as autonomy, opacity, and agency—­but they have not singled out what many people perceive to be the biggest prob­lem with the rise of automating technologies, namely, that they reallocate power by centralizing and enhancing the influence of technology companies over our lives. This is, no doubt, a very serious concern." [mijn nadruk] (127-128)

"I ­haven’t made them the central focus of my arguments in this chapter for the ­simple reason that I think they are peripheral to the question of ­human flourishing and meaning"(128)

[Dat is een belachelijk standpunt.]

"Assuming that my characterization of the threats to flourishing and autonomy is accurate, what does it all mean? The ­simple answer is that it means we need to work to mitigate and minimize ­these threats: to try to ensure that automating technologies help rather than hinder our flourishing. This is ­going to be easier said than done." [mijn nadruk] (128)

[Zeg dat wel. ]

(133) Part Two - Utopia

In dit deel gaat het over Propositie 3 en 4.

(135) Chapter 5 - In Search of Utopia

"To this point, I have argued that we should embrace the idea of a post-­work future, albeit with some degree of caution. Such a ­future could be utopian if we get it right. But what exactly does it mean to get it right? How can the ­future be utopian? This chapter provides an answer to that question, starting with a cautionary tale."(135)

"The idea of “plea­sure on tap,” though initially seductive, strikes many ­people as being anti-­utopian. It is certainly a long way from what one finds in famous utopian works of fiction and philosophy."(136)

"First ­things first, let’s clarify the meaning of the word itself. A utopia is an ideal society. Indeed, in everyday parlance, “utopia” is usually synonymous with the ideal society—­the society, out of all the pos­si­ble socie­ties that could exist, that is the best. In philosophical and academic parlance, “utopia” has a more precise meaning. It is a par­tic­u­lar type of ideal society, usually one that is better than the current real­ity but still practically attainable." [mijn nadruk] (137)

"And fi­nally, ­there is the Utopia, which is a society in which socio-­technical institutions have been improved and help to rescue ­humans from their own flaws and imperfections (without divine assistance)."(137-138)

"Furthermore, I use it to highlight how, of all our imaginings about the ideal society, the truly utopian imaginings might be the ones that are closest to our pre­sent real­ity. They require the least fanciful speculation about the future of the world and our place within it, and do not depend for their success on some super­natural savior. They focus on practically attainable technological and so­cio­log­i­cal reform." [mijn nadruk] (138)

Danaher neemt de definitie van Christopher Yorke over en bespreekt die:

"Christopher Yorke captures this style of utopian thinking in his definition of the concept of a utopia, which I propose to use throughout the remainder of this book: Utopia = “Any prospectively achievable scheme of radical social-­political improvement which would, if installed, leave ­every affected party better off and none worse while respecting the rights of all.”
This definition packs a lot of impor­tant ideas into a small space. First, it clearly stipulates that a utopia must be “prospectively achievable,” which means that it must be practically and technically pos­si­ble for us to realize it. A purely speculative, pie-­in-­the-­sky ideal society is no good. Second, it states that the change in the ordering of the world would need to be “radical” in order to count as utopian. As Yorke put it in conversation with me, imagining the current world with one small improvement, such as every­one getting a ­free ice-­cream on Sundays, ­wouldn’t be enough for it to count as a utopia. ­There needs to be some radical break from the current real­ity. Third, Yorke’s definition also clearly stipulates that a utopia cannot be achieved on the backs of ­ others; it must re­spect every­ one’s rights and leave them better off. This addresses one of the big worries about utopian proj­ects (discussed in more detail below), which is that they often justify ­ great suffering on the road to the ­ imagined utopia. That said, Yorke’s definition might go too far in saying that every­one must be made better off by the change. It’s prob­ably very difficult to prove or ensure that this is the case, however valuable it might be as an aspiration. Respecting their rights—­that is, ensuring that they can participate in, challenge, and be compensated by the utopian proj­ect—­seems far more impor­tant and practically attainable." [mijn nadruk] (138-139)

[Dat derde punt is inderdaad het zwakste. Veel radicale veranderingen gaan natuurlijk ten koste van bepaalde maatschappelijke groepen zoals rijke kapitalisten, religieuze conservatieven, en zo meer. Je kunt het niet iedereen naar de zin maken en je kunt op sommige punten geen compromissen sluiten. Stel dat ik een samenleving wil waarin niemand meer dan € 50.000 aan inkomen heeft. Stel dat ik een samenleving wil waarin seks onder jongeren aanvaardbaar is en er alles aan gedaan wordt om dat mogelijk te maken met seksuele voorlichting, voorbehoedmiddelen, abortus voor als het fout gaat, en zo meer. Wat denk je dat de reactie zal zijn van die groepen?]

[Danahers verdere betoog over 'mogelijke werelden' vind ik niet boeiend, is namelijk afhankelijk van je 'mogelijk' of 'onmogelijk' vindt en is dus normatief. ]

"To summarize, a utopia is a pos­si­ble, but practically achievable, world that represents a radical (moral) improvement over the current world. When imagining and evaluating potential ­ future utopias, we need to avoid narrow-­ mindedness and parochialism and consider the possibility that some elements of our existing understanding of flourishing and meaning ­ will need to be extirpated or re­imagined in a utopia. In other words, the landscape of pos­si­ble ­future utopias might be wider than we initially suppose." [mijn nadruk] (143)

"So far so good. We have a clearer conception of what a utopia is and how to explore the landscape of pos­si­ble post-­work utopias. Are ­ there any other considerations or constraints that we should bear in mind while ­ doing this? ­ There are three: (i) we need to avoid the temptation to use vio­lence and understand the allure of negative utopianism; (ii) we need to ensure that our ­envisaged utopia maintains a balance between stability and dynamism; and (iii) we need to bridge the cultural gap between our pre­sent world and any pos­ si­ble ­future utopia. Let’s consider all three constraints in a l­ittle more detail." [mijn nadruk] (143-144)

"But Popper wants to go beyond historical evidence in making his case. He wants to argue that an impulse to vio­lence is inherent to all utopian movements, not just an accident of history. It is the natu­ral consequence of three fundamental features of how ­ human socie­ties work: plurality, conflict, and irrationality. “Plurality” is the fact that dif­fer­ent groups of ­humans have dif­fer­ent blueprints for the ideal society (meaning, dif­fer­ent groups have dif­fer­ent conceptions of utopia). “Conflict” is the fact that, on at least some occasions (and perhaps many), these dif­fer­ent groups, and their dif­fer­ent utopian visions, come into direct conflict. It is, therefore, not pos­si­ble for the groups to live in harmony with one another. “Irrationality” is the fact that it is not always possi­ble for these disharmonious groups to resolve their conflicts by rational means; oftentimes vio­lence is the only way to eliminate the conflict. Combined, ­ these three features of society point to an inherent tendency ­toward vio­lence in utopian thought. Only by denying the truth of one or more of ­these features can you overcome this tendency." [mijn nadruk] (145)

[Dat heeft Popper goed gezien, maar dat betekent nog niet dat we die radicale veranderingen niet moeten willen en bepaalde opvattingen niet moeten willen onderdrukken.]

"That said, ­there are some prob­lems with Popper’s argument that make his critique of utopian thinking less compelling than it first appears. One prob­lem is that Popper is prob­ably guilty of overextending the definition of vio­lence in his critique and as a consequence misdiagnosing one of the main prob­lems with utopian po­liti­cal proj­ects."(146)

"The other prob­lem with Popper’s concern about vio­lence is that his definition of utopianism is itself deeply misleading insofar as it assumes that utopianism is always built around a clear and precise specification of what the ideal society should look like. Most modern utopian thought rejects this notion. ­There is no precise blueprint for an ideal society. Rather, the ideal society is one that allows for dynamism and change over time. I discuss this in more detail below."(147)

"So, in sum, Popper’s critique of utopianism ­shouldn’t dissuade us from undertaking the utopian quest. It should just be viewed as providing additional guidance on how we are to undertake that quest."(150)

"But stability can also have a dark side, one that is antithetical to utopian aspirations. Without some sense of unease with the pre­sent real­ity, and without some goals and aspirations for improvement, it seems like we would have ­little reason to get out of bed in the morning. If a utopia was truly a stable end point of social development, then it would be pretty boring." [mijn nadruk] (151)

"So stability is attractive but it also has its dark side. How do we resolve this apparent paradox and what does it mean for the utopian proj­ect? The answer is straightforward. We need to achieve stability in the right areas—­a reduction of conflict, deprivation, and suffering—­while maintaining dynamism in ­others—­innovation, discovery, development."(152)

[Ook dat is erg normatief. ]

"Christopher Yorke emphasizes this idea by calling for a sharp distinction between what he calls “blueprint” and “horizonal” models of utopian thinking:
Blueprint Utopianism: This is a type of utopianism that focuses on achieving some stable, ideal end state for humanity.
Horizonal Utopianism: This is a type of utopianism that focuses on constantly shifting horizons of desire for humanity. It is premised on the idea that ­there is no single, ideal blueprint that represents a stable end state for humanity. Utopia is, rather, always just over the horizon: it is something we aim for but never quite achieve.(...) It should be obvious from what I have said ­ here that I too ­ favor the horizonal model. It avoids the pitfalls associated with stability and apathy. It also helps to avoid the Popperian fear of vio­lence and the trampling on the rights of others." [mijn nadruk] (152-153)

[Dat laatste weet ik nog zo net niet.]

(157) Chapter 6 - The Cyborg Utopia

"This is just a small sample of the wannabe cyborgs. ­ There are countless other bio-­hackers and “grinders” who experiment with chip implants and cy- borg enhancements in their basements and backyards. Many of ­these self-experimenters conceive of what they are ­doing as something that is explicitly utopian, as a way of expanding our moral horizons and exploring a new possibility space. Some of them think it essential that we do this. They think we have become trapped in a suboptimal moral equilibrium and that what is holding us back is our evolved, biological hardware. We need an upgrade if we are to have any chance of radically improving our lot." [mijn nadruk] (159)

[Ik zie niet hoe dat onze morele horizon zou verwijden. ]

"In the remainder of this chapter I want to consider whether their strategy offers a credible path to utopia. In doing so, I ­will defend the third of the four propositions set out in the introductory chapter:"(159-160)

"I am now ­going to evaluate the utopian prospects of the cyborg revolution. I ­will do this in two stages. First, I ­will pre­sent five arguments in favor of the Cyborg Utopia. When combined, ­ these arguments paint what I believe to be a compelling picture of what life might be like in such a pos­si­ble world. Then, I ­will pre­sent six objections to the Cyborg Utopia that make it seem less attractive. I will conclude that the Cyborg Utopia—­ tantalizing and seductive though it may be—is not the utopia we are looking for. Let’s start with the five arguments in ­favor of cyborgization." [mijn nadruk] (170)

[Ik vind op het eerste gezicht de hele sociale dimensie ontbreken. Het is allemaal het aanpassen van een individu.]

"The second argument in f­avor of the Cyborg Utopia takes up this idea of radical possibility. It claims that pursuing cyborgization ­will allow us to realize an improved model of the good life.(...) The claim then is that cyborgization, particularly when understood as part and parcel of an enhancement proj­ect, is a way of removing these obstacles to greater flourishing and meaning. By fusing ourselves with machines, we can enhance our biological capacities and overcome our limitations. Of course, you could argue that this is what technology always does and that ­there is no need for cyborg technologies to overcome the obstacles to greater flourishing and meaning."(174-175)

[Waarom zouden we onze beperkingen - wat voor beperkingen? - moeten overstijgen? ]

"But how many obstacles can we expect the pro­cess of cyborgization to remove? ­Will it ­ really enable greater flourishing and meaning anytime soon? Well, it is already ­doing this to some extent. Neuroprosthetics and brain-­ computer interfaces allow ­those who have lost some functionality (or never had it in the first place) to overcome the limitations this might impose. And it is not just about replacing lost functions. It is also about adding new ones, overcoming limitations, and opening up new ways of living the good life."(176)

"The possibilities ­here are staggering, particularly if the vari­ous methods of cyborgization are pursued in tandem: new forms of interpersonal communication and intimacy ­will be pos­si­ble; new forms of action and embodiment ­will be realized; new enhanced moods and experiential awareness ­ will become the norm. Cyborgization ­will open us up to new ways of living the good life that we never realized ­were ­there."(177)

[Maar precies de voorbeelden van die nieuwe mogelijkheden overtuigen nauwelijks. Veel 'technobabble' hier.]

"The final argument for the Cyborg Utopia is the most straightforward. It is that increased cyborgization ­ will make us more existentially robust and, at the limit, possibly even allow us to escape the clutches of death."(187)

"I do not discount any of this. I find myself attracted to certain aspects of the Cyborg Utopia. Nevertheless, t­here is a darker side to that vision, one that suggests that hunkering down in the cognitive niche may not be the best response to the rise of automating technologies. I want to consider six problems with the vision now."(191)

"The idea is that by becoming more machine-­like we can stave off ­these threats and build a more utopian future. But what if we ­can’t? What if the technological breakthroughs required for fuller forms of cyborgization can only be achieved in the very long term? How do we deal with the intervening de­cades (or centuries) of automated immiseration?"(210)

[Precies.]

"In the next chapter, I want to consider an alternative utopian proposal: the Virtual Utopia. This proposal, in many ways, suffers from the inverse fate of the Cyborg Utopia: it seems neither utopian nor practical at a first pass, but on closer inspection proves to be very attractive."(213)

(214) Chapter 7 - The Virtual Utopia

"But I ­won’t dwell on the gender issue ­here. I want to focus on the deeper question prompted by ­these alarmist tracts: is the retreat from the world of work, and into virtual worlds such as ­those provided by video games, something to fear? The authors mentioned in the previous paragraph clearly see it as a dystopian move, as a shift away from what is natu­ral and desirable. And you can see where they are coming from. The retreat to the virtual seems to be a retreat from the conditions of meaning and flourishing outlined in Chapter 4, from the very ­things we need to survive and thrive."(215)

"This dystopian take on the retreat to the virtual has its appeal. But in the remainder of this chapter I ­will argue that it is wrong. Far from being a dystopian move, the retreat to the virtual is, in fact, exactly what we need to realize a genuinely post-­work utopia. In other words, in the remainder of this chapter, I ­will be defending the fourth, and final, proposition that I outlined in Chapter 1:"(216)

"I ­will develop the case for the Virtual Utopia in four stages. First, I ­will spend a ­little time explaining what the Virtual Utopia would look like, focusing in par­tic­u­lar on what distinguishes the virtual from the real. Second, I ­ will use this understanding of the distinction between the virtual and the real to develop an argument in ­favor of the Virtual Utopia, one that is based on the work of Bernard Suits and his so-­called utopia of games. Third, I ­will develop another argument for the Virtual Utopia, this time based on the work of Robert Nozick and his concept of a meta-­utopia. Fourth, and fi­nally, I ­will respond to some criticisms of the Virtual Utopia and offer an overall assessment of its utopian merits."(216)

[Dat lijkt me een onzinnige positie.]

"According to this trope, a virtual real­ity is a computer-­generated world, one that might be fantastical or a simulation of the real world. We immerse ourselves in this world ­ either by entering a room in which the computer-­generated world is broadcast to us from strategically located screens, or, more commonly, by donning a helmet or a set of goggles that broadcasts the simulation directly into our skulls. We might also wear some special clothing, or carry some special tool or object, that tracks our physical movement so that this can be projected into the computer simulation. If done well, the experience can be quite remarkable. You can lose your sense of belonging in the physical world and become absorbed in the simulated one."(217)

[En dat moeten we willen, omdat?? ]

"It’s ethereal and immaterial. It ­ doesn’t have the heft and weight of the real world of ­matter and molecules. But this judgment requires some qualification. ­After all, many of the ­things that happen to you in a computer-­simulated environment can be just as real as if they happened to you in the physical world. You can have real conversations with ­people and form alliances and friendships with them. You can spend and lose real money. You can also experience ­things that have spillover effects into the real world. Some of ­these experiences might be traumatic, maybe even criminal."(218)

[Nee, dat is niet waar. Dat zijn geen echte gesprekken. Dat is een cerebraal mannenstandpunt. Gesprekken zijn niet alleen maar woorden en gebaren op afstand. Tijdens echte gesprekken kun je elkaar aanraken.]

"One of the key ideas in Kantian philosophy is that our perception of the world is not the perception of the world as it is in itself, but is rather a ­mental projection over that real­ity. In other words, the world as we perceive it is a simulation, not the real ­ thing."(219)

[Weer eens het onzinnige idee van 'das Ding an sich'. Hoe zouden we van het bestaan ervan kunnen weten als alles alleen maar waarneming is? Die laatste zin is totale bullshit.]

"Fortunately, you ­don’t have to go as far as McKenna or Kant to think that much of what we call “real” is, in fact, virtual. I ­ magined realities are a ­ fter all the lubricant of social life. One of the big promoters of this view in recent times is the historian / futurist Yuval Noah Harari. In his best­selling books Sapiens and Home Deus, Harari repeatedly emphasizes the idea that much of what we take for granted in our everyday lives is not inherent in the physical real­ity that we perceive. It is, rather, a personal, cultural, or social construction that is layered over that real­ity." [mijn nadruk] (219)

[Verkeerd taalgebruik: sociale constructies zijn de realiteit en niet een laag over de realiteit. Het feit dat Yuval Noah Harari zo populair is zou te denken moeten geven. De analyses die nu volgen zijn van het academische filosofische soort, met een bespreking van allerlei auteurs. ]

"In summary, I think the utopia of games does offer a credible utopian proj­ect for humanity. Getting to a world in which we spend the majority of our time playing games would represent a significant societal achievement. It would mean that we have removed several forms of scarcity and want. And games themselves can provide us with a potentially infinite set of worlds in which we can flourish and find meaning. This may require some compromises, but ­those compromises would be worth it, and would build upon long-­standing ­human ideals such as the ideals of craftsmanship, play, achievement, and virtue-­building. It is a much more plausible and practical utopia than might initially seem to be the case."(251)

(271) Epilogue - The Unending Quest

[Niks nieuws. ]